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How do infants, children, and adults learn grammatical rules from the mere observation of 
grammatically structured sequences? We present an embodied hypothesis that (a) people 
covertly imitate stimuli; (b) imitation tunes the particular neuromuscular systems used in the 
imitation, facilitating transitions between the states corresponding to the successive grammatical 
stimuli; and (c) the discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical stimuli is based 
on differential ease of imitation of the sequences. We report two experiments consistent with 
the embodied account of statistical learning. Experiment 1 demonstrates that sequences 
composed of stimuli imitated with different neuromuscular systems were more difficult to 
learn compared to sequences imitated within a single neuromuscular system. Experiment 2 
provides further evidence by showing that selectively interfering with the tuned neuromuscular 
system while attempting to discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical sequences 
disrupted performance only on sequences imitated by that particular neuromuscular system. 
Together these results are difficult for theories postulating that grammatical rule learning is 
based primarily on abstract statistics representing transition probabilities.
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and  Bargh,  1999)  and  using  neurophysiological  measures  (e.g., 
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Wilson (2001) presents a review of 
the literature supporting the claim that people reliably imitate, and 
she suggests a wide variety of functions of imitation.
Second, imitation is a neuromuscular phenomenon, that is, it 
requires cortical mechanisms that control particular effectors (e.g., 
the speech articulators, the hands, etc.) to generate the motor com-
mands that would produce an imitation of the stimulus, even if the 
actual production is inhibited (e.g., Grush, 2004; Iacoboni, 2008). As 
elements of the sequence are imitated, the particular neuromuscular 
system used to produce the imitations is forced to make transitions 
between neuromuscular states. In this manner, the neuromuscular 
system becomes tuned to the environment (the grammar) so that 
some sequences, the grammatical ones, can be imitated with alacrity. 
This tuning is consistent with the literature on use-induced plasticity 
(e.g., Classen et al., 1998).
Third, when participants are asked to determine if a sequence 
is grammatical, they base their judgments on the implicit fluency 
with which they can imitate the sequence. Because of previous 
tuning, grammatical sequences are imitated more fluently than 
non-grammatical sequences. This account of statistical learning is 
similar in kind to the account of the mere exposure effect provided 
by Topolinski and Strack (2009), as well as the differences observed 
in the recognition memory of skilled versus unskilled typists for 
fluent letter dyads (Yang et al., 2009).
We tested this embodied account of statistical learning in two 
experiments. In the first experiment, we show that people have little 
difficulty discriminating between grammatical and ungrammatical 
sequences when the successive stimuli in a sequence can be imitated 
within the same neuromuscular system. However, when the same 
grammatical rules are instantiated by stimuli imitated using differ-
ent neuromuscular systems, performance drops to chance levels. 
IntroductIon
We speak grammatical English without being able to say much about 
the rules of English grammar. How is that procedural knowledge 
learned, and where does it reside? One answer is given by the study 
of statistical learning, which is the ability to learn (often without 
intent) which sequences of stimuli are consistent with a set of rules. 
It has been observed in both infants and adults, in the visual, audi-
tory, and tactile domains, and in a variety of stimulus displays from 
simple to complex to real-world scenes (Reber, 1967; Saffran et al., 
1996, 1999; Fiser and Aslin, 2001, 2005; Saffran, 2001; Creel et al., 
2004; Conway and Christiansen, 2005; Brady and Oliva, 2008). One 
explanation of the phenomenon is that it reflects a domain-general 
learning process: the brain is wired to pick up and represent statistics. 
Another (Conway and Christiansen, 2006) is that this learning is 
modality-constrained. We describe and test an embodied mecha-
nism for statistical learning that is consistent with the notion of 
modality constraints but that also suggests why the phenomenon is 
robust enough to be classified as a general learning process.
Artificial grammar learning (AGL, e.g., Reber, 1967; Conway 
and Christiansen, 2005) is a paradigm case of statistical learning. 
Participants are exposed to sequences of stimuli such as tones, visual 
patterns, or tactile sensations. Attention to the stimuli is enforced 
by, for example, asking the participant to judge if two successive 
sequences are identical. After exposure to the sequences, partici-
pants are asked to discriminate between (a) sequences consistent 
with the rules used to generate the training sequences and (b) 
sequences generated by other rules. Although participants often 
profess no knowledge of the rules, they are successful in making 
the discrimination. How do they do this?
Our theory has three tenets. First, when people attend to stimuli, 
they concurrently imitate successive stimuli, often without awareness. 
Imitation of this sort is documented both behaviorally (e.g., Chartrand Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 184  |  2
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Consider, however, the alternating sequences. The alternating 
grammatical sequences instantiate exactly the same grammar used 
during training and used during the tests in the single-modality 
conditions. Thus, the alternating statistical regularities are exactly 
the same as the single-modality statistical regularities. If those regu-
larities alone are the primary basis of performance, then perform-
ance should be the same as in the single-modality case.
On  the  embodied  account,  however,  the  imitation  of 
sequences  during  training  does  not  produce  cross-modality 
tuning as readily as single-modality tuning. This is because the 
eye movement system tunes itself to produce sequences of eye 
movements, and the laryngeal system tunes itself to produce 
sequences of hummed tones. However, the eye movement system 
does not tune itself to produce a hummed tone, and vice versa. 
This is not to say that cross-modal tuning is impossible given 
the embodied account of statistical learning. Cross-modal tun-
ing likely occurs on a regular basis in natural settings (e.g., the 
visual stimulus “D-O-G” may tune the speech articulators to 
produce the sound “dog”); this type of cross-domain mapping 
may only occur after considerable repetition relative to the sort 
of single-system tuning described here, which should arise out 
of biomechanical necessity.
To better understand why cross-modal tuning should not occur 
here, consider the neuromuscular systems used in imitating an 
alternating sequence. Starting with a stimulus 1 at a particular visual 
location, the eye movement system is tuned to move to other loca-
tions (for stimulus 2) that form a grammatical sequence. However, 
stimulus two is a tone. On imitating the tone, the laryngeal system is 
tuned to produce other tones that conform to stimulus 3, however 
stimulus 3 is a visual stimulus. Note that we left the eye movement 
system ready to move to the location of stimulus 2, but instead 
it must direct the eyes to the location of stimulus 3. This is an 
unpracticed transition that should be produced with less fluency 
than a practiced transition. Thus, when imitating the alternating 
test sequences, grammatical and ungrammatical sequences should 
be imitated with equal dysfluency, and discrimination performance 
should drop dramatically.
MaterIals and Methods
This study was approved by the Arizona State University (ASU) 
IRB and was conducted in accordance with the approved standards. 
All participants gave informed consent. The participants were 20 
Arizona State University undergraduates recruited from introduc-
tory psychology classes who received course credit. Four partici-
pants were excluded due to computer errors.
Visual  stimuli  were  presented  on  15”  LCD  monitors,  and 
auditory stimuli were presented using headphones. Participants 
responded using the keyboard.
A modified version of the Gomez and Gerken (1999) gram-
mar was used to create 12 grammatical sequences, ranging from 
3 to 6 stimuli in length and composed of the numbers 1–5. Each 
of the numbers referred to one of five locations on the computer 
screen (each corner and the middle) at which a small black box 
was presented. In addition, each number referred to one of five 
tone frequencies (210, 245, 288, 333, and 385 Hz). The training 
sequences were constructed so that the box locations and tones 
were completely redundant with one another. Items within a   single 
These results are consistent with the embodied account of statistical 
learning presented here, but they leave open the possibility of an 
alternative, attention-based account of domain-general statistical 
learning. In the second experiment, we directly test the importance 
of the domain-specific fluency gained from imitation of the train-
ing sequences by demonstrating that occupying neuromuscular 
system A disrupts the ability to discriminate between grammati-
cal and ungrammatical sequences that are imitated using system 
A. Importantly, however, occupying system A has little effect on 
discrimination when the sequence is imitated using system B. The 
results suggest that the ability to access information in the form of 
domain-specific fluency is a large contributor to the subsequent 
recognition of grammatical sequences.
experIMent 1
We used a modified AGL paradigm similar to the one used by Conway 
and Christiansen (2005). During training, participants were exposed 
to pairs of grammatical sequences, and decided if the sequences 
within each pair were identical. During the test phase, participants 
were exposed to novel sequences. Half of the test sequences were gen-
erated by the grammar and half violated the grammar. Participants 
were asked to decide if each novel sequence was grammatical.
The key to the experiment is that participants received a single 
grammar expressed simultaneously in two modalities, auditory 
tones and visual boxes at different locations (Figure 1). During 
the test phase, however, they received only half of the information 
contained in the training sequences: auditory-only, visual-only, or 
alternating modalities. An alternating sequence begins with either 
a visual or auditory stimulus, and then it is followed by a stimulus 
in the other modality. This modality alternation continues until 
the end of the sequence.
Exposure to the dual modality sequences during training should 
engender imitation of the tones using the vocal folds (i.e., humming) 
and subsequent tuning of the laryngeal neuromuscular system. 
This tuning should allow easy discrimination between grammatical 
and ungrammatical single-modality auditory sequences at the test. 
Similarly, the dual modality sequences at training should engen-
der tuning of the eye movement system to follow the sequence 
of spatial locations. This tuning should allow easy discrimination 
between grammatical and ungrammatical single-modality visual 
sequences at the test.
Figure 1 | Left: The large rectangle represents the layout of the 
computer screen for experiments 1 and 2. The five numbered boxes show 
the five possible locations of the visual stimuli and beside them are the five 
possible tones (in Hz) associated with each location. Right: A graphical 
representation of the visual sequence “1 2 3” as it would have appeared.www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 184  |  3
Marsh and Glenberg  Embodied statistics
right feet). Sounds were demonstrated for the participants via the 
headphones to ensure that they understood the task. Furthermore, 
this demonstration ensured that participants produced the sounds 
with similar timing (i.e., one hummed note took approximately the 
same time to produce as one “da” and as one stomp).
The embodied stance predicts that humming should drastically 
interfere with imitation using the laryngeal system and thereby 
disrupt discrimination between grammatical and ungrammatical 
auditory sequences. The other two tasks should be far less disrup-
tive for the auditory sequences (note that the da-da task requires 
transitions in the speech articulators but few transitions in the vocal 
folds). None of the tasks should interfere with discrimination of 
the visual sequences because they do not affect transitions of the 
eyes between successive stimulus locations.
The attention-switching hypothesis, however, suggests a number 
of possible outcomes. First, it might be the case that the presence 
of the secondary task will disrupt performance ubiquitously, since 
attention is being divided in all test conditions. Second, it might 
be the case that performance on visual sequences alone is affected, 
since attention is being divided between production of an audi-
tory stimulus and perception of a visual sequence. Though it can-
not be ruled out, this seems a slim possibility. More likely is the 
third possibility. That is, the production of auditory stimuli should 
interfere with the perception of auditory stimuli alone because 
attention is being divided within a single modality. Note, however, 
that this account provides no clear reason to assume any differ-
ence in the level of interference associated with the production of 
one sound versus another. The disruption of auditory sequences 
should be ubiquitous.
MaterIals and Methods
This study was approved by the Arizona State University (ASU) 
IRB and was conducted in accordance with the approved stand-
ards. All participants provided informed consent. The participants 
were 69 ASU undergraduates and staff. Participants received $10 
in exchange for 1 h of participation. During the hour, participants 
completed this and an unrelated study. Three participants were 
excluded for not following instructions.
All materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1, as 
was the training phase procedure. In the testing phase, participants 
were exposed to 16 sequences in each modality while engaged in one 
of the three secondary tasks (manipulated between participants). 
The order of the modalities was counterbalanced.
results
Means are presented in Table 1.
The groups did not differ in regard to performance during 
training (all ps > 0.25). The major analysis was based on two, 
single df contrasts to test predictions derived from the embodied 
theory. The first contrast compared the difference between the 
auditory and visual test sequences during the siren task to the 
same difference during the da-da and stomping tasks. As pre-
dicted, the difference was larger for the siren task than for the 
others, t(66) = 1.97, p-rep = 0.88. The second contrast compared 
the visual-auditory difference for the da-da task to the differ-
ence for the stomping task, and as predicted this effect was not 
significant, t(66) < 1.
sequence were displayed for 250 ms with a 150 ms inter-item inter-
val; a sequence was separated from its mate within the training 
pair by a 1000 ms.
Half of the 24 novel test sequences conformed to the train-
ing grammar and half did not. The ungrammatical sequences 
contained the same beginning and ending stimuli as the gram-
matical sequences and differed only in internal transitions. Eight 
test sequences were used for each of the auditory, visual, and 
alternating tests. We counterbalanced both the order of the test-
  sequence modalities and the assignment of eight sequences to 
the modalities.
results
Proportions correct on the auditory and visual test sequences 
were above chance (0.50); Auditory-only sequences: M = 0.625, 
SEM = 0.045, t(19) = 2.77, p-rep = 0.942; visual-only sequences 
(M = 0.625, SEM = 0.054), t(19) = 2.33, p-rep = 0.907. However, 
performance on the alternating sequences was at chance (M = 0.481, 
SEM = 0.032), t(19) = −0.590, p-rep = 0.456. Tests of within-
subjects contrasts demonstrated a significant difference between 
the auditory-only and the alternating sequences, F(1,19) = 6.24, 
p-rep = 0.979, and a significant difference between the visual-only 
and the alternating sequences, F(1,19) = 7.33, p-rep = 0.940.
These results are in accord with the predictions of the embodied 
account of statistical learning. There remains, however, an alterna-
tive explanation that is in keeping with a domain-general mecha-
nism. It is possible that the learning of alternating sequences is 
constrained by attention to one modality at a time. Though it has 
been demonstrated that people can learn two separate grammars at 
one time when the stimuli comprising each grammar are perceptu-
ally distinct (Conway and Christiansen, 2006), the cost of switch-
ing attention between perceptually distinct stimuli within a single 
sequence may account for the apparent dysfluency for alternating 
sequences.  Thus,  the  attention-switching  account  would  claim 
that it is not necessarily the motor-fluency induced by modality-
specific imitations that contributes to learning, but that attention 
is modality-specific. The resulting knowledge may still be domain-
free statistics that can be applied to any single-modality sequences 
at the time of test (as this should produce no added demand on 
attentional resources). In this case, statistics abstracted from the 
auditory sequences alone should provide adequate recognition of 
grammatical sequences instantiated in the visual modality, and 
vice versa. However, the alternating sequences (and consequent 
  attention-switching costs) disrupt the application of this domain-
free statistical knowledge. Consequently, we tested another predic-
tion of the embodied account.
experIMent 2
We used a selective interference task to test between the embodied 
account and the attention-switching account. The learning phase 
of this experiment was identical to that of Experiment 1. In the test 
phase, participants judged the grammaticality of both auditory and 
visual sequences while performing one of three secondary tasks: 
humming two notes requiring alternating changes in the laryngeal 
system (making the high-low sound of a siren), mouth sounds 
requiring alternating changes in the speech articulators (saying 
“da-da”), and feet sounds (alternating stomps with the left and Frontiers in Psychology  |  Cognition    November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 184  |  4
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Although one might postulate special attentional demands within 
each of these systems (e.g., the siren task disrupts auditory atten-
tion but the da-da task does not), such an account would be highly 
unparsimonious to say the least.
dIscussIon
Can our simple embodied account accommodate all of the facts 
of statistical learning? Probably not. For instance, the last parts of 
an auditory sequence are learned best, compared to the first parts 
of a tactile sequence (Conway and Christiansen, 2005). This is not 
predicted by our account; but then neither is it by the analytic 
process account.
Nonetheless, embodiment offers a compelling account of a 
good proportion of the literature as well as novel predictions. For 
example, it predicts the learning of non-adjacent dependencies 
(e.g., between the first and third stimulus), will be facilitated if the 
intervening stimulus is imitated with a different neuromuscular 
system. Suppose that the first stimulus is tonal, the second visual, 
and the third tonal. Imitation of first stimulus leaves the laryngeal 
system in a particular state that is not affected by imitation of the 
visual stimulus. Then, imitation of the third stimulus produces a 
transition from the state of the laryngeal system after humming 
the first stimulus to the state of the system used to hum the third. 
In fact, Gebhart et al. (2009) report that the learning of remote 
dependencies only occurs when intervening stimuli are dissimilar 
to their flankers.
The  embodied  account  also  explains  how  Conway  and 
Christiansen (2006) participants could manage to learn two differ-
ent grammars when sequences from the grammars were interleaved 
and presented in different modalities. In Conway and Christiansen, 
learning tuned two neuromuscular systems, and testing required 
tuned  transitions  within  each  of  the  systems.  In,  contrast,  in 
Experiment 1, learning tuned two systems, but testing required 
un-tuned transitions across systems.
Finally,  Saffran  et  al.  (2008)  demonstrated  that  cotton-top 
tamarin monkeys can learn simple grammars instantiated by five 
spoken syllables, but not a more complex grammar instantiated 
by eight syllables. Our account predicts that if the complex gram-
mar were instantiated in a neuromuscular system the tamarins 
can use more successfully for imitation (e.g., a reaching system), 
then the tamarins would have greater success in learning the 
complex grammar.
In the first paragraph of the introduction, we noted that the 
embodied mechanism for statistical learning is consistent with 
the notion of modality constraints, but that it also suggests why 
the phenomenon is robust enough to be classified as a general 
learning process. We think that neuromuscular tuning is likely to 
be found in all neuromuscular systems. Thus, one should be able 
to find statistical learning in for example, eye movement control, 
speech articulation, humming, finger movements, and so on. Thus, 
the learning mechanism (neuromuscular tuning) is found across 
many domains, and at the same time it is highly embodied.
Few native speakers can explain the rules with which grammar-
ians describe their behavior. The present study suggests that such 
rules are embodied in differentially conditioned neuromuscular 
networks; the body has rules that its mind does not, and need 
not, know.
These data challenge the attention-switching alternative in a 
number of ways. First, there is no clear reason why any of the inter-
fering tasks should disrupt performance based on these abstract 
symbols unless attention was being divided at the time of test. On 
this account, however, there is no reason why the siren task should 
disrupt performance with the auditory sequences more than per-
formance with the visual sequences. If the disruption was based 
on a masking effect of the sounds (unlikely given that headphones 
were used to present the stimuli) or the subdivision of attention 
within the auditory modality, then the da-da task should also have 
disrupted performance, but it did not.
In contrast, the results are in accord with the embodied account. 
Discriminating between grammatical and ungrammatical auditory 
sequences requires using the larynx to imitate the auditory stimuli. 
The siren task occupies that neuromuscular system and thereby 
reduces performance. Because the da-da task requires changes in 
the lips and tongue more than the larynx, it does not disrupt per-
formance. Discriminating between grammatical and ungrammati-
cal visual sequences requires using the eyes, possibly along with 
neck musculature, to imitate (or follow) the locations of the visual 
stimuli. None of the secondary tasks disrupt eye movements, and 
hence there is little disruption in discrimination performance.
Another reason for discounting the attention-switching account 
is that we have been able to demonstrate selective interference in the 
visual modality in the absence of any need for attention-switching. 
Marsh and Glenberg (2010) manipulated the participants’ head 
orientation relative to the computer screen from training to test. In 
this experiment, participants either faced the screen directly or at a 
45° angle during training. During test, this orientation was either 
preserved or switched to the alternative orientation. Participants 
who maintained the same head orientation (thus using the same eye 
movements during training and testing) performed normally on 
the visual and auditory test sequences. Participants who switched 
head orientation between training and test (thus using different, 
un-tuned eye movements during the test), however, performed 
poorly on the visual test sequences while performing well above 
chance on the auditory sequences. This finding provides further 
support for the generality of neuromuscular tuning account. Note 
that changing the orientation of the head to the screen does not 
require any attention-switching, so an attention-switching account 
would have difficulty predicting these results.
Thus, in Experiment 2, selectively interfering with the laryngeal 
system reduces discrimination between grammatical and ungram-
matical auditory stimuli, but not visual stimuli. And, as found in 
Marsh and Glenberg (2010), selectively interfering with the eye 
movement control system reduces discrimination between gram-
matical and ungrammatical visual stimuli, but not auditory stimuli. 
Table 1 | For each of the three secondary tasks, number correct during 
training (standard errors in parentheses), and proportion correct during 
the test phase.
group  Training  Auditory test  Visual test
Siren (n=22)  69.32 (0.59)  0.59 (0.03)  0.70 (0.04)
Da-da (n=25)  67 .76 (0.81)  0.66 (0.03)  0.66 (0.04)
Stomp (n=22)  68.77 (0.67)  0.66 (0.04)  0.66 (0.04)www.frontiersin.org  November 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 184  |  5
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